Among the casualties in the 'war on terror' is the presumption of innocence. It is now known that four
Parmi les victimes de la «guerre contre le terrorisme» figure la présomption d'innocence. On sait maintenant que quatre Canadiens qui ont fait l'objet d'enquêtes par la GRC et le SCRS ont été détenus et torturés en Syrie suite à des renseignements ayant leur origine au Canada et partagés par le Canada. Nul d'entre eux n'a jamais été accusé de crime. À leur retour, tous les quatre hommes ont demandé un processus qui exposerait la vérité au sujet du rôle d'agences canadiennes dans ce qui leur est arrivé et qui éventuellement leur aiderait à rétablir leur réputation et refaire leur vie. À ce jour, à des degrés divers, tous les quatre hommes attendent toujours ce «processus». Dans cet article, j'examine les mécanismes d'accès à la justice à la disposition de personnes accusées faussement d'implication dans des activités terroristes. Par le biais de l'étude du cas de l'un des quatre hommes, Abdullah Almalki, j'explore les processus divers à sa disposition : (i) une plainte aux organismes pertinents qui reçoivent les plaintes au pays, le Comité de surveillance des activités de renseignements de sécurité et la Commission des plaintes du public contre la GRC; (ii) une commission d'enquête; et (iii) une réclamation en délit civil. En grande partie à cause du rôle que joue la confidentialité
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for persons charged wth terrorsm offences.
10 Non-ctzens who are accused of lnks to terrorsm also may aval themselves of consttutonal protectons and the court system. 11 Smlarly, those people and organzatons lsted domestcally or nternatonally have some ablty (albet lmted) to become delsted. 12 But what of those terrorsm suspects who are nether formally charged, nor lsted, nor subject to a securty certficate? What remedes are avalable to those tanted -and damaged -by natonal securty nvestgatons?
I wll look at ths vexng problem by usng the case study of Abdullah Almalk, a former clent of the author, a man "accused" of terrorst lnks and whose human rghts were volated as a consequence.
13 I wll explore the varous access to justce mechansms avalable to hm: () a complant to the relevant domestc complants bodes, the Securty Intellgence Revew Commttee (SIRC) and the Commsson for Publc Complants Aganst the RCMP (CPC); () a commsson of nqury; and () a cvl tort clam. Whle much has been wrtten about commssons of nqury generally, and the partcular obstacles facng legal clams by torture survvors, lttle legal scholarshp explores ether the lmts of the nqury model for those seekng accountablty n the natonal securty context, or the utlty of admnstratve revew bodes for vctms of a mscarrage of justce. Moreover, whle each avenue has ts nherent lmtatons and dfficultes, all three share a common obstacle: natonal securty confidentalty. The mpact of state secrecy on an ndvdual's attempt to acheve redress under all three optons represents a unque barrer to justce that deserves partcular attenton.
Admttedly, Almalk's case s one of the most egregous examples of the mpact of wrongful accusatons on a contnuum of harm. Others who are targeted by natonal securty nvestgatons may experence less pronounced stgma or less severe ncursons nto ther daly lves, but face many 14 The lstng process has a number of safeguards. Applcaton can be made for revew of the decson to lst, first to the Mnster of Publc Safety and then to the Federal Court. There s a specfic procedure to protect those who may be mstakenly dentfied as a lsted entty. As well, the lst of enttes must be revewed two years after ts establshment and every two years thereafter, although to date, no lsted entty has been delsted pursuant to the b-annual revew. Vol. 27 (1) Access to Justice for the Wrongfully Accused 175 regardng access to justce mechansms should they seek exoneraton or reparatons. In ths way, the answers to the questons posed n ths essay may be of moment not just to the four men whose cases have receved consderable publc attenton, but wll also be sgnficant for the hundreds of others who assert that they have been vctmzed by flawed ntellgence actvtes. 15 Ultmately, the avalablty of remedes for those caught n the snares of terrorsm nvestgatons s a crucal ssue not just for the clamants themselves. Access to justce for those descrbed by Kent Roach and Gary Trotter as "collateral damage"
16 n the fight aganst terrorsm has mportant mplcatons for our very conceptons of the "just socety," and for the success of the fight tself. Falure to heed the wrongfully accused's call to account wll "erode the hgh ground that democraces that only punsh the gulty should have n the war aganst terror," 17 and condemns the wrongfully accused ndefintely.
II. ACCESS TO JUSTICE pARADIGM
Access to justce enjoys consderable play n legal and poltcal dscourse. It s a domnant theme n law reform ntatves and government programs. 18 It has been posted as a human rght, 19 and confirmed as a consttutonal rght. 20 In ts more lmted concepton, t refers fundamentally to the range of nsttutonal arrangements that enable people to access the justce system for the vndcaton of ther rghts. 21 More broadly, t refers to partcpaton n every nsttuton "where law s debated, created, found, organzed, admnstered, nterpreted and appled."
22 It has generated a tremendous body of legal lterature, yet ts content experenced less severe repercussons would be able to rally sufficent publc and poltcal support for a commsson of nqury to be struck. 15 Determnng the precse number of people along the contnuum s not possble. 23 Few would deny the mportance of access to justce as a foundatonal prncple n a lberal democracy, but how such a prncple manfests tself "on the ground" elcts anythng but unanmty.
Access to justce n ths paper refers primarily to the applcable legal norms and nsttutons that facltate access to law and the legal process.
24 "Justce," more broadly defined, also ncludes consderatons of the procedural, substantve, and symbolc components dentfied most often wth Professor Roderck Macdonald. That s, access to justce must be consdered n ts pluralstc and multdmensonal forms: as a matter of procedure, t s about both ganng access to decson-makng nsttutons and to procedural farness once engaged wthn them; as a matter of substance, t must produce effectve remedes that make rght the mbalance between natonal securty and human securty; and as a matter of socal symbolsm, t asks whether the legal system empowers and engages ts ctzenry, partcularly those wth dsparate socal power and 'otherness.' 25 Elements of ths more holstc vson of access to justce wll also be consdered, though t s beyond the scope of the paper to examne fully all stes where "law s debated, created, found, organzed, admnstered, nterpreted and appled" 26 from the perspectve of the wrongfully accused.
That I focus my analyss on the avalablty of access to justce mechansms for those targeted n ant-terrorsm nvestgatons s not to suggest that perfect or even adequate access to justce exsts for those who are accused and acqutted of tradtonal crmnal offences, or who are wrongfully convcted of such offences. It s arguable that publcty surroundng a crmnal charge n tself permanently harms an ndvdual, even f the charges are ultmately dsmssed. The recent recognton by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) of the tort of neglgent nvestgaton 27 may hold lttle promse of meanngful justce gven the hgh threshold that must be met to establsh the tort, n addton to the usual ltany of economc barrers that ltgants face n our cvl justce system. Moreover, at tmes advocates for the wrongfully convcted, have clamed that even a verdct of 'not gulty' stops short of complete exoneraton and s nsufficent to completely dspel the stgma and shame whch encumber ther clents. 28 Nevertheless, n the 
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Access to Justice for the Wrongfully Accused 177 crmnal law context the accused has consttutonally entrenched rghts to a far tral, to Charter protectons and clearly defined rules of evdence, to Legal Ad, and to the presumpton of nnocence. Ultmately, n our legal system, an acquttal means somethng -the next best thng to a declaraton of nnocence.
29
My central clam here, however, s that obtanng access to justce n the ant-terrorsm context s pecularly problematc. Natonal securty nvestgatons rarely lead to crmnal charges. Nevertheless, pervasve concerns wth terrorsm "obstruct access to justce at the domestc level as states ncreasngly justfy encroachments on cvl lbertes n defence of natonal securty."
30 Whle the legalty of certan ant-terrorsm measures remans suspect even where bona fide charges of terrorsm wth a sound evdentary bass are lad, 31 I am partcularly concerned here wth those ndvduals who are the terrorsm nvestgaton equvalents of the wrongfully convcted: wrongly accused by government officals publcly and/or n communcatons wth foregn agences as assocated wth terrorsm, adversely affected n ther employment or busnesses by heghtened scrutny, harassed by border guards, polce officers or ntellgence agents, detaned on the bass of those allegatons, or, n the most extreme cases, tortured. In ths way, I do not adhere to the strct postvst nterpretaton of a mscarrage of justce proffered by Roach and Trotter n ther study. 32 Whle they argue for a conceptualzaton of a mscarrage of justce that ncludes all deprvatons of lberty, my concepton of a mscarrage of justce s broader, and captures the experence of those who are not detaned drectly by Canadan authortes (f at all) but who nevertheless are harmed by the terrorst label. Lke Roach and Trotter, I presuppose the factual nnocence of at least some terrorsm nvestgaton targets 33 Despte the length, ntrusveness, and scope of the nvestgaton nto Almalk's lfe, busness, and acquantances, no charges were ever lad aganst hm by Canadan authortes. FBI nvestgators refused to launch a crmnal nvestgaton nto Almalk's actvtes.
39
On hs way to jon hs parents and vst famly n Syra n early May, 2002, Almalk was detaned at Damascus Arport. A lttle over five months earler, another Canadan, El Maat, was also detaned at the same arport. Lke El Maat before hm, and Arar and Nureddn after hm, Almalk was taken to the Palestne Branch of the Syran Mltary Intellgence and was repeatedly tortured, nterrogated and forced to sgn documents he was not permtted to read. All four men were held n dark, underground cells, measurng three by sx by seven feet. Almalk's tenure was the longest: 482 days n soltary confinement, n a cell known to prsoners as "the grave." dentalty after the hearngs had concluded, when counsel for the non-government partcpants (ncludng Arar, the ntervenor organzatons, and belatedly, Almalk 41 ) were no longer able to explore the crcumstances surroundng the decson to send questons and the mpact of the questons on Almalk and Arar. 42 Commssoner Iacobucc found that both the sharng of the Supertext database wth U.S. officals n Aprl 2002, and the sendng of questons n January 2003, "resulted ndrectly n mstreatment of Mr. Almalk and were deficent n the crcumstances," 43 and that the "mstreatment" amounted to torture. 44 As Almalk had clamed from the tme he was released from custody n Syra, hs nterrogatons were based on nformaton that could only have orgnated n Canada; Commssoner Iacobucc concluded that "t s reasonable to nfer that the documents provded n the Supertext database, or nformaton from those documents, made ther way nto the hands of Syran officals, and were then used by them, together wth other nformaton, to nterrogate Mr. Almalk n Syra." 45 Although never charged wth an offence n ether Canada or the Unted States, n late 2003, after 18 months n detenton wthout charge, Almalk was charged under Artcle 278 of the Syrian Penal Code. 46 In July 2004, the Syran Supreme State Securty Court, a court whose trals fall far short of nternatonal standards for far trals, 47 acqutted Almalk. 48 Nevertheless, doubts about hs nnocence persst.
As 
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Access to Justice for the Wrongfully Accused 181 malk was one of four Canadans lnked to an al Qaeda cell. 49 In November 2003, unnamed Canadan officals descrbed Almalk as "the man target" of terrorsm nvestgatons to the Ottawa Citizen. 50 Most recently, durng the press conference on the date of the release of Commssoner Iacobucc's report, and n numerous meda ntervews thereafter, Mnster of Publc Safety, Stockwell Day referred reporters specfically to paragraph 42 of the Attorney-General's final submssons, n response to questons about the status of natonal securty nvestgatons regardng Almalk. Paragraph 42 of the document reads n part, …Canada had credble nformaton that the actvtes of Mr. Almalk posed a threat to the securty of ths country. … Mr. Almalk assocated wth known Islamst extremsts n Canada and abroad, ncludng senor members of al Qaeda. He s beleved to have served as a procurement officer for that organzaton. 51 Importantly, Mnster Day faled to pont out that the paragraph, whch was not even couched n the usual language of allegatons, was contaned n a document that dd not consttute evdence, and that was vgorously contested by counsel for Almalk.
None of the evdence that mght exst n support of the government's allegatons has ever been presented to Almalk or hs counsel, precludng hm from challengng the allegatons or questonng the proprety of the ways n whch he was targeted by Canadan officals. Despte submssons to the Commssoner that he should not "smply repeat the Government's unproven, untested and lbelous allegatons aganst the three men" n hs final report, 52 an entre chapter was devoted to the summary of those allegatons, 53 wth only two paragraphs cautonng that nothng stated n the report should be taken as an ndcaton that the government's allegatons are founded. 54 Whether the cautonary language s sufficent to rebut the aura of gult s questonable; Commssoner O'Connor found that n terrorsm nvestgatons, mproper and unfar labels n a wrtten document carry an ar of authorty: "Statements made by polce officers tend to be taken at face value" and "have a way of stckng to an ndvdual, […] becomng the accepted fact or wsdom."
55 Ths s perhaps even more true wth statements repeated n an offical report by a commsson of nqury. Mscarrages of justce greet Almalk, therefore, on numerous levels. Frst, he s targeted by a natonal securty nvestgaton for assocatons wth others and for allegedly suspcous busness transactons. Though not formally charged nor permtted to test the ntellgence and answer hs accusers, he s labeled an "Islamc extremst" and a "Bn Laden assocate." The label becomes evdence as quckly as t s crculated around the world, n what Guttet and others descrbe as the blurrng of the lne between ntellgence data and probatve evdence to the advantage of so-called "natonal securty mperatves." 56 Ths njustce leads to the next, more profound volaton of Almalk's human rghts, when the ntellgence qua evdence s used to detan, nterrogate and torture hm n Syra. Accordng to Hooper's dstasteful metaphor for the trade-off between securty and rghts quoted at the outset of ths Part, sharng nformaton wth human rghts abusng regmes and sacrficng the rghts of suspected terrorsts s a necessary evl, and thereby condones Almalk's mstreatment. When not permanently condemned to the torture chamber, he s then perpetually condemned through repeated allegatons of terrorsm not only va meda leaks, but also by pronouncements of Mnsters and n a Commssoner's report. How, then, to unravel the njustce?
Counsel's final submssons to the Commsson alluded to the poverty of access to justce mechansms. In the course of pressng the Commssoner to find categorcally that labels attached to the three men by Canadan officals were grossly naccurate, unfar, and msleadng, counsel wrote:
There s no other forum n whch Messrs. Almalk, El Maat and Nureddn wll be able to clear ther names. Absent a crmnal charge, the men wll not be afforded the opportunty to know and meet the case aganst them. Cvl ltgaton s unlkely to provde them access to justce n lght of the government's consstent overuse of natonal securty confidentalty clams. … Commssoner Iacobucc has a sngular opportunty to expose the ways n whch these three Canadan ctzens were mslabeled and mscharacterzed, and dentfy the deficences n the nvestgatons whch led to the sharng of naccurate and msleadng nformaton, and ultmately, to ther detenton and mstreatment abroad. We urge the Commssoner to provde Messrs. Almalk, El Maat and Nureddn wth the answers -and the justce -they deserve. 57 The extent to whch the nqury model can serve effectve access to justce wll be 
Access to Justice for the Wrongfully Accused 183 examned n Part V of ths paper. Two other man optons present themselves: a cvl torts clam, and complants to the admnstratve bodes that provde oversght of Canada's natonal securty nvestgatons.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE ACCESS TO JUSTICE: COMpLAINTS TO SIRC AND THE CpC
If ndvduals have complants regardng actons of law enforcement and securty ntellgence personnel, we have robust ndependent revew and accountablty mechansms n place. They are there to be used. 
A. CpC (Commission for public Complaints Against the RCMp)
The CPC was created n 1988 as an ndependent agency to provde cvlan revew of the RCMP's polcng actvtes. 59 The CPC's jursdcton s relatvely broad; t may examne any complant concernng the conduct, n the performance of any duty or functon under the RCMP Act or the Witness Protection Program Act, of any RCMP member, whether or not the complanant s affected by the subject-matter of the complant. 60 Investgatons can be trggered n one of three ways: () a drect complant by a cvlan to the CPC; 61 () a request for a revew of a complant made to the RCMP; 62 or () a Char-ntated complant.
63
Commssoners retan wde dscreton wth respect to complants made drectly to the CPC; they may drect that no nvestgaton of a complant be commenced or that an nvestgaton be termnated f, n the Commssoner's opnon, (a) the complant s one that could more approprately be dealt wth, ntally or completely, accordng to a procedure provded under any other Act of Parlament; The Char of the CPC harbours no llusons about the capacty of hs agency to provde effectve oversght and to ensure accountablty n the conduct of polcng actvty. In December 2008, n hs openng remarks markng the 20 th annversary of the CPC, Charman Paul E. Kennedy descrbed the Commsson as provdng "nadequate cvlan oversght," due prmarly to the ncongruence between ts powers of revew and the ntrusveness of the powers held by the body over whch t exercses revew. 67 Indeed, snce 2005 the overarchng objectve of the CPC has been the "urgent need for stronger and more effectve cvlan oversght of the RCMP."
68
The CPC has done consderable work wth Taser-related and other n-custody death cases, 69 but appears to have had lttle nvolvement wth complants concernng natonal securty nvestgatons. One excepton s ts revew of Project Thread. The 2003 nvestgaton of Ottawa Busness College led to the arrest of 23 Muslm students who the RCMP and Immgraton officals suspected of possessng fraudulent mmgraton documents, but who were descrbed to the meda as posng threats to natonal securty. The RCMP subsequently confirmed that there was "absolutely no evdence to suggest that there s any terrorst threat anywhere n ths country related to ths nvestgaton." 70 The CPC concluded that the Force dd not engage n racal profilng on a very narrow definton of the term, and determned that no apology by the Force was warranted snce t dd not control the mmgraton detenton process where the allegatons of terrorsm were orgnally made. The CPC's lmted jursdcton n ths nstance s ndcatve of a larger problem faced by the wrongfully accused: an effectve access to justce mechansm must provde access to all of the relevant nformaton and the power to revew the conduct of every government agency or department tasked wth a natonal securty mandate. The necessty of abandonng a compartmentalzed approach to revew and accountablty based on rgd departmental boundares s drven by the very nature of natonal securty work n Canada: a network of governmental enttes encouraged to share nformaton and cooperate n a comprehensve approach to securty.
Maher Arar also complaned to the CPC; ts nvestgaton of Arar's complant was suspended durng the currency of the Inqury and then termnated mmedately followng the release of Commssoner O'Connor's report. 71 Gven that the powers of the Arar Commsson were much broader than those afforded to the CPC under ts enablng legslaton, the decson to termnate the nvestgaton flows predctably from the Commssoner's powers under s. 45.36(5)(a) of the RCMP Act. 72 The same outcome lkely awats Almalk's complant, launched n August 2005, 73 and held n abeyance pendng the report of the Iacobucc Inqury. The determnaton of the proprety of specfic steps taken by unnamed officals n the course of a mult-year nvestgaton would, n any event, yeld pecemeal justce. For those wrongfully accused of terrorsm-related offences, there s no one event that can be scrutnzed. Indeed, many are not even aware of the specfic events that have adversely affected them; ths lack of transparency sgnficantly compromses the usefulness of a complants process. 74 A seres of decsons, assumptons, and speculatons made by nnumerable, faceless officals, n fulfillment of the prmary mandate to prevent a future attack, "lead to condemnaton through allegatons of terrorsm rather than proof." 75 ) at 500. In ths paper, however, I am concerned wth precsely the opposte problem: the wrongfully accused know that they are the subject of an nvestgaton because of the ramficatons of the labels and shared ntellgence for ther lberty and securty nterests. 75 Guttet, supra note 56 at 6. mandated to revew an officer's "performance of any duty or functon" under the RCMP Act 76 s ncapable of unravelng the net of suspcon that entangles such cases. Coupled wth the nablty to summons documents, gan access to Cabnet confidences, or compel wtnesses, an nvestgaton by CPC yelds no meanngful justce.
The CPC's process meets none of the objectves of the access to justce paradgm proffered at the outset of ths paper. Whle drect access to the agency promses at least modest procedural justce, the partcpaton rghts of complanants, and the crcumscrbed procedural powers of the agency tself, render access to justce largely hollow. Moreover, the absence of compensaton lmts the substantve qualty of ths accountablty mechansm.
B. SIRC [Security Intelligence Review Committee]
In 1977, prompted by allegatons of unlawful and mproper behavour by securty ntellgence officers wthn the RCMP, the government establshed the Commsson of Inqury Concernng Certan Actvtes of the RCMP, chared by Mr. Justce Davd McDonald. 77 The Commsson concluded that, due to the dfferences between securty ntellgence work and polce work, the government ought to separate the two functons of the RCMP. As a result, CSIS was created, and SIRC was establshed to revew the actvtes of the new ntellgence agency. 78 SIRC conssts of a commttee apponted by the government and supported by securty-cleared staff. Unlke the CPC, SIRC has access to senstve CSIS documents, ncludng documents protected by natonal securty confidentalty. SIRC does not have access, however, to documents that are consdered to consttute Cabnet confidences, ncludng CSIS' Securty Intellgence Reports whch are provded to the Governor-n-Councl for, among other thngs, the terrorst lstng process. SIRC's prmary functon s to revew CSIS' past practces and provde advce to CSIS and the bodes of government that drect t, regardng potental modficatons to polcy and procedure. 79 SIRC's second role s to nvestgate complants. Complants to SIRC may be made n wrtng drectly to SIRC by ndvduals who clam to have been harmed by CSIS actvtes or who were dened securty clearance. Once the complant s receved, SIRC staff conducts an ntal revew to establsh whether the complant falls wthn SIRC's jursdcton. If jursdcton s establshed, one or more Commttee members nvestgate the complant through a quas-judcal hearng wth the assstance of staff and a securty cleared lawyer. The complanant has the rght to be represented by counsel and to make submssons at the hearng. SIRC's senor counsel crossexamnes CSIS wtnesses when evdence must be heard n secret due to clams of natonal securty confidentalty. 
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Secton 54 of the CSIS Act also enttles SIRC to provde the Mnster of Publc Safety wth a specal report "on any matter relatng to the performance of CSIS' dutes and functons" 81 that are of partcular mportance. In 2006, after the Canadan Cvl Lbertes Assocaton rased concerns about Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a Canadan ctzen detaned n Oman post-9/11, SIRC nvestgated and submtted a s. 54 report. The approach taken by SIRC n Jabarah's case provdes mportant nsght nto the efficacy of a complant to SIRC from an access to justce perspectve.
CSIS officals ntervewed Jabarah n Oman after beng notfied by authortes there of hs capture. CSIS then arranged for hs transportaton on a Canadan arcraft to Canada, where he was agan ntervewed, wthout the benefit of counsel. Accordng to CSIS, Jabarah confessed to beng an al Qada member and leader of a terrorst cell that planned to bomb the Amercan and Israel embasses n Sngapore and Manla. After 'consultatons' wth CSIS, Jabarah voluntarly agreed to be transferred to the Unted States, where he would face terrorsm charges. In early 2008, he was convcted of terrorsm offences and sentenced to lfe n prson by a New York federal court.
82
Despte the then Publc Safety Mnster's assurances that CSIS's conduct was approprate and wthn ts mandate, SIRC found that CSIS' actons were not wholly consstent wth the CSIS Act and n many ways volated the Charter.
83
SIRC questoned CSIS' contenton that Jabarah's self-crmnaton and surrender to the U.S. were made freely. In ts 2006-2007 Specal Report, SIRC crtczed CSIS' actons, ncludng the falure to read Jabarah hs rghts.
84 SIRC took ssue wth CSIS' vew that, because t s not a polce servce, t was not requred to comply wth such Charter protectons. SIRC further stated:
Furthermore, an agent of the state must uphold the Charter otherwse Canadan officals would be free to pck and choose to whom certan guaranteed rghts and freedoms would apply. Clearly, that would be unacceptable to all Canadans. SIRC recognzes that polce and securty ntellgence agences n the post 9/11 world must deal wth dauntng challenges, ncludng globalzed and technologcally sophstcated terrorst groups. We also know that the relatve safety that Canadans enjoy s thanks n large part to the efforts of these same agences on our behalf. But the oblgaton to ensure publc safety ought not to reduce n any way respect for the rule of law. The extent to whch the recommendatons 87 that flowed from SIRC's nvestgaton of the Jabarah case have been followed remans doubtful, however. A prevous recommendaton stemmng from a revew of CSIS' statements about Human Concern Internatonal, a Muslm chartable organzaton that CSIS has descrbed publcly as lnked to al Qaeda, have gone unheeded. SIRC revewed all of the classfied nformaton that CSIS clamed "more than adequately supported" the statement lnkng the charty to al Qaeda, and found that the allegatons were unsubstantated.
88 SIRC recommended both an apology and a retracton of the statement to the two natonal newspapers; to date, CSIS has done nether.
Despte ts more robust revew powers, SIRC's ablty to mete out effectve justce s very lmted when the Human Concern Internatonal and Jabarah cases are consdered. In the latter case, the retrospectve analyss of Jabarah's treatment at the hands of CSIS agents dd not alter the course of hs crmnal prosecuton; whether SIRC's systemc recommendatons wll be followed remans to be seen, but the falure to secure the release of other detaned Canadans, despte SIRC's recommendaton that the Department of Foregn Affars and Internatonal Trade [DFAIT] take the lead n matters nvolvng detaned Canadans, s cause for some doubt. 89 Smlarly, CSIS' falure to retract ts "unsubstantated statements" about Human Concern Internatonal as recommended by SIRC evdences the oversght body's lack of moral and legal suason vs-à-vs CSIS.
A complant by Almalk to SIRC would face these same barrers. In addton, there s the antecedent ssue of secrecy nherent n CSIS actvtes: whle Almalk knows that he was of nterest to CSIS startng n 1998 -roncally, due n part to Almalk's volunteer work wth Human Concern Internatonal n an rrgaton project n Afghanstan -he knows lttle about the "conduct" of CSIS agents on 
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Access to Justice for the Wrongfully Accused 189 whch to base a complant. 90 Unlke the Human Concern Internatonal example, n whch a specfic publc statement s the bass of the SIRC nvestgaton, or Jabarah, where CSIS officals' detenton and treatment of a suspect are ascertanable to the ndvdual at ssue, there s no dscrete statement or event that would nform the typcal wrongfully accused's decson whether to submt a complant. Commssoner O'Connor commented on the challenges to effectve accountablty posed by the lack of transparency nherent n natonal securty nvestgatons, where those affected "wll seldom be aware of the specfic nvestgatve steps that may have an mpact on ther nterests." 91 That sad, t s possble that the lmted dsclosure avalable through the SIRC process mght yeld modest results. When a complant s accepted for nvestgaton, the Commttee encourages the complanant to do an Access to Informaton request to CSIS and any relevant departments. Then, when the ex parte porton of the hearng s conducted, the complanant s gven a redacted transcrpt or a summary, prepared by the Commttee n consultaton wth CSIS, whch excludes nformaton protected by natonal securty confidentalty. After gettng the transcrpt or summary, the complanant may ether pursue ssues n cross-examnaton or (usually more usefully) ask SIRC counsel to pursue the ssue n a further ex parte sesson.
92
Almalk's ablty to test the relablty of ntellgence sources, therefore, s theoretcally better n the SIRC context than any other, thanks to the role of Senor SIRC Counsel who s responsble for cross-examnng CSIS wtnesses in camera. Nevertheless, SIRC's mandate s not to provde compensaton or a declaraton of nnocence to a complanant. Even f SIRC found that specfic statements by CSIS about Almalk were "unsubstantated," t s unlkely, gven the poltcal context n whch CSIS operates and ts track record vis-à-vis other SIRC recommendatons, that t would ssue any publc statements of apology.
Commssoner Iacobucc found that the labels attrbuted to Almalk by ntellgence officals -that he was "an mmnent threat" and "lnked through assocaton to al-Qaeda" -were naccurate, nflammatory and lackng nvestgatve foundaton.
93 Smlar findngs have prevously been made wth respect to descrptors attached to Maher Arar 94 and to Human Concern Internatonal.
95
Whle t s true that the publc wll rarely know when CSIS 'gets t rght,' these examples of CSIS 'gettng t wrong' post-9/11 are troublng. About ths perod of heghtened fear of 'the next wave,' Guttet has wrtten that the power of suspcon and the use of ntellgence data has been legtmzed as reasonable, though naccessble, proofs of a person's gult, leadng to condemnaton through allegatons of terrorsm rather than proof. 96 CSIS plays a crtcal role n the condemnaton of ndvduals lke Almalk, although the SIRC revew process s not commensurate wth the power that CSIS welds.
V. COMMISSION OF INqUIRY
It seems nevtable, n the struggle aganst terrorsm, that mstakes of varous knds wll be made.
Commssoner Frank Iacobucc
97
The lmtatons of exstng nsttutonal vehcles, lke SIRC and the CPC, to deal effectvely wth matters of grave publc concern and potental government wrongdong are often the raison d'être of publc nqures. 98 Commssons of nqury are vewed as a surrogate form of democratc accountablty and partcpaton, the effect of whch s to restore publc confidence and provde a communty healng functon.
99
A range of choces presents tself to governments when decdng how to respond to "tragedes such as ndustral dsasters, plane crashes, unexplaned nfant deaths, allegatons of wdespread chld sexual abuse, or grave mscarrages of justce." 100 At one end of the spectrum s a full publc nqury pursuant to the federal or provncal nqures acts. At the other end, "there s the revew wth no statutory authorty, no powers to compel and no hearngs."
101 It has been suggested that the latter s approprate where "there has already been a publc tral, there s no suggeston of a wrongful convcton, and there s lkely to be lttle conflct of evdence as to what actually happened."
102 It has also been posted that snce the federal Inquiries Act nowhere requres that an nqury be held n publc, f the nformaton needed can be gathered wthout publc hearngs, "ths may be the best way to safeguard reputatons" of those whose msconduct s at ssue. 104 Commssoner O'Connor's recommendaton stemmed, at least n part, from the long campagn by several non-governmental groups, ncludng Amnesty Internatonal and the Brtsh Columba Cvl Lbertes Assocaton, whch called for an nqury nto the perceved pattern of complcty n torture represented by the cases of Arar and the other three men. Commssoner O'Connor's recommendaton, however, was worded n a way that would come to justfy very unusual terms of reference: whle he called for a comprehensve nqury that would nspre publc confidence n the outcome, he suggested that somethng other than a "full-scale publc Inqury" would be desrable snce natonal securty ssues were nvolved.
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105
Soon thereafter, counsel for the three men wrote to the Mnster of Publc Safety askng that the nqury process be desgned ndependently. 106 In partcular, they expressed concern that Department of Justce lawyers were draftng the terms of reference for the Inqury. Snce Commssoner O'Connor had found that "DOJ lawyers and the Project A-O Canada team mantaned open lnes of communcaton" throughout the nvestgaton of the three men; that "Project A-O Canada personnel sought legal advce for all nvestgatve steps," and that DOJ lawyers "regularly attended the nvestgators' meetngs and jont management team meetngs where the nformaton sharng was dscussed,"
107 an appearance of a conflct of nterest, f not an actual conflct, ought to have precluded Justce lawyers from draftng the terms of reference. Counsel called nstead for an ndependent thrd party, lke Commssoner O'Connor or hs counsel, to be consulted by government n the desgn of the revew process.
108
The requests by lawyers for the men were unsuccessful, but emblematc of a larger rony true of almost all commssons of nqury. The very entty whose officals are to be the subject of the revew decdes whether and how to establsh the revew process. Some have descrbed ths fact as a "truly extraordnary" feature of our democracy, snce "very few natons subject ther governments to ths knd of ndependent and publc scrutny."
109 Others submt that the dependence on Cabnet's wll to call an nqury "serously hamper[s] the capacty of the commsson of nqury to serve as an effectve nstrument for the formulaton of publc polcy" and enables governments, "for purely partsan reasons, to refuse to establsh commssons of nqury nto matters that clearly mert ndependent nvestgaton."
110
The Federal Cabnet ultmately decded to call an "nternal nqury" nto the actons of Canadan officals n relaton to Almalk, El Maat and Nureddn.
111
The preamble to the terms of reference recalled Commssoner O'Connor's caveat about full-scale publc nqures and drected the Commssoner to "adopt any procedures and methods that he consders expedent for the proper conduct of the Inqury, whle takng all steps necessary to ensure that the Inqury s conducted n prvate."
112 Followng an ntal hearng to determne standng, 113 counsel for the three men and for several ntervenors submtted that "prvate" dd not mean ex parte, that the terms only called for in camera hearngs where natonal securty confidentalty clams were made, and that counsel should be securty cleared to permt ther attendance at, and partcpaton, n the prvate hearngs.
114
To do otherwse would place expedton above transparency and thoroughness, and would reward the government for overclamng natonal securty confidentalty durng the Arar Inqury. 115 Commssoner Iacobucc rejected ths nterpretaton of the terms of reference, and adopted nstead the vew proposed by the Attorney-General: for reasons of natonal securty confidentalty and expedton, "prvate" must be nterpreted to mean in camera and ex parte.
116 Thus, none of the Inqury's hearngs were held n publc, save for one-and-a-half days of publc submssons on the legal standards for assessng conduct of officals.
117 No documentary evdence was dsclosed to non-government partcpants n the Inqury; no opportunty to test the evdence gven by wtnesses was provded; and no transcrpts were made avalable. A "draft factual narratve" whch contaned a summary of the evdence heard by Commsson counsel that was not subject to natonal securty confidentalty was provded to counsel for the three men and ntervenors, but not to the three men themselves. Report, supra note 7, appendx K.
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Ths secretveness was hghly unusual for commssons of nqury. Of the more than 400 nqures called pursuant to nqures legslaton snce Confederaton, 119 sx had terms of reference notng the necessty of protectng nformaton relatng to natonal securty: the Royal Commsson on Esponage, 120 the McDonald Commsson, 121 Somala, 122 Arar, 123 and Ar Inda Flght 182. 124 Of the sx, only the Esponage Commsson, whch was resoundngly condemned for ts secrecy and abuse of cvl lbertes, 125 and the Iacobucc Inqury had presumptvely prvate mandates, even though all sx nqures of necessty nvolved evdence aganst whch the government clamed natonal securty confidentalty. Indeed, the McDonald Commsson, whch nvestgated the actons of RCMP officals, was drected by ts terms of reference "to hold in camera all matters relatng to natonal securty and n all other matters where the Commssoners [deemed] t desrable n the publc nterest or n the nterest of the prvacy of ndvduals nvolved n specfic cases whch may be examned." 126 The Commssoners rejected the nference that there would be lttle evdence heard n publc gven the nature of the Inqury, statng that t "s of the greatest mportance that hearngs before a Trbunal of Inqury -whch s what they call them n England -should be held n publc. It s only when the publc s present that the publc wll have complete confidence that everythng possble has been done for the purpose of arrvng at the truth. ..." 127 Repeated applcatons by counsel for the men and other non-government partcpants to open up the Iacobucc process n order to nspre publc confidence n, and brng greater transparency, to the Inqury's work were rejected largely on the bass of a restrctve nterpretaton of the terms of reference. 128 Ths, despte the Prme Mnster's statements that amendments to the Inqury's mandate to expressly requre publc hearngs were unnecessary because "Justce Iacobucc has all the power necessary to decde whether somethng should be held n prvate or whether t can be held n publc." 129 That no redacted evdence was dsclosed to the partes s also a sgn of the normalzaton of extraordnary measures dscussed by Gross and others. 130 That s, extraordnary measures taken wthn tradtonal legal systems start us down a slppery slope on whch what was formerly "extraordnary" becomes the new norm, and what was necessary n the name of ant-terrorsm measures becomes acceptable n other areas. No emprcal study has been conducted regardng the ncdence of natonal securty clams post-9/11 n Canada, be t n the mmgraton, crmnal or prvacy legslaton contexts. Natonal securty clams have had a markedly ncreased presence, however, wthn publc nqures. Apart from the government's overclamng n the Arar context as referred to earler, the government's unprncpled approach to natonal securty clams almost brought the Ar Inda Inqury to a halt 131 and was the subject of commentary at the Federal Court. 132 The culture of secrecy and resstance to publc scrutny that has been observed generally n the natonal securty sphere, 133 has creeped nto publc nqures as well. Pontedly, n respect of the Arar, Ar Inda, and Iacobucc Inqures, one RCMP offical (wth the concurrence of CSIS' top brass) referred to them, wth no small rony, as "judcal jhad." • He was unable to determne on the record avalable to hm whether the actons of Canadan officals "lkely contrbuted to" and therefore "resulted ndrectly n" Almalk's detenton n Syra.
• Almalk suffered mstreatment n Syra amountng to torture.
• Almalk's mstreatment resulted "ndrectly" from the sharng of the RCMP's Supertext database and the sendng of questons to Syra.
• Consular officals were deficent n ther provson of servces.
135
The Commssoner dd not, however, name the ndvduals whose conduct caused the mscarrage of justce. Smlarly, he dd not expressly clear Almalk's name n the way that Commssoner O'Connor had done for Arar. Ctng hs terms of reference, Commssoner Iacobucc wrote:
Followng on the observaton that the Inqury was nvestgatve and not adversaral, I cannot emphasze enough that the subject matter of the Inqury was the actons of Canadan officals, not the conduct of Mr. Amalk [sc], Mr. Elmaat and Mr. Nureddn. They are not charged wth anythng, are not on tral, and have no case to meet. They have certanly not been convcted of any crme.
In settng out the factual background to my findngs, I have necessarly made references to certan allegatons about these three ndvduals. However, nothng I state n ths report should be taken as an ndcaton that those allegatons are founded. Makng determnatons concernng these allegatons s planly and smply not wthn my Terms of Reference.
I recognze that the mere fact of beng named n allegatons, especally allegatons that are repeated publcly, can affect the reputatons of those named and ther famles. That s regrettable, but unfortunately, largely unavodable n vew of the matters that I have been mandated to examne. But I reterate that Mr. Amalk [sc], Mr. Elmaat and Mr. Nureddn are not charged wth and have not been convcted of any offence. Both the law and fundamental farness dctate that they be presumed nnocent of any wrongdong.
approach by the two Commssoners -and the lack of clearly exculpatory language n the Iacobucc Report -was not lost on the press, 137 and questons were rased as to whether Almalk's name was truly vndcated.
The lmted terms of reference and the nsstence on holdng the Inqury vrtually entrely n secret have ramficatons n our access to justce framework. From a process perspectve, the Iacobucc Inqury was a falure for Almalk and the other two men. 138 The non-government organzatons wth standng at the Inqury were unanmous n ther vew that the process was so unacceptable that t should never be repeated, no matter what the content of the ensung report. 139 The process was sad to be dehumanzng and dsempowerng for the men, and ultmately undermned ther ablty to be confident n the accuracy and thoroughness of the final report. 140 In ths way, the oft-cted "namng and blamng" functon of the publc nqury process for vctms and survvors of tragedes was lost. 141 From a substantve justce perspectve, the Inqury yelded mportant results, n the form of answers to some of Almalk's questons about hs ordeal, and an unequvocal recognton that hs mstreatment amounted to torture. For a torture survvor, the latter has partcular mportance. Although Almalk could also rghtly feel some vndcaton from the assessment by Commssoner Iacobucc that at least n two nstances, the terrorst label was msappled to Almalk, he clamed that the Inqury experence was n many ways a recurrence of hs experence n Syra, where he was powerless to defend hmself aganst the words and actons of hs accusers. 142 Moreover, the repetton n the report of untested but hugely damagng accusatons of terrorsm may serve to confirm condemnaton by suspcon for some.
Inqures also generally aspre to be "very useful tools for remndng leaders and the publc of the mportance of the democratc oblgatons to provde an accountng -answers -for what those entrusted wth power do wth t." 143 The lack of publc engagement n the Iacobucc Inqury process equally has negatve ramficatons for the socal symbolsm aspect of access to justce. As wth any
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Access to Justice for the Wrongfully Accused 197 nqury, 'success' can only fully be measured by the government's response to the commssoner's findngs. The Mnster for Publc Safety was quck to dsmss the pattern of human rghts abuses n natonal securty nvestgatons as "good people actng wth deficent procedures," on the heels of Commssoner Iacobucc's statement that he found no evdence that Canadan officals acted malcously. 144 In such statements, we hear echoes of the attempts often made to dsmss wrongful convctons as systemc problems n the admnstraton of justce. 145 In dong so, we lose opportuntes to dentfy ndvdual behavour wthn such nsttutons that leads to mscarrages of justce. The reluctance of Commssoner Iacobucc to dentfy the ndvduals who were responsble for what occurred n Almalk's case compromses the accountablty functon of the nqury model, and fals to secure meanngful justce for the vctm.
VI. TORT CLAIM
The nexus between commssons of nqury and cvl ltgaton has been the subject of both general observaton and specfic comment at one of the few publc hearngs before the Iacobucc Inqury. Fact-findng nqures n partcular can be reframed as an accessory to ltgaton, "souped-up polce nvestgatons" or "state-sponsored 'pre-tral' dscovery processes."
146 Smlarly, counsel for the Attorney-General submtted to Commssoner Iacobucc that the Inqury could not be used by Almalk and the other men to further ther ltgaton nterests:
They have a substantal and drect nterest n the subject matter of ths nqury, as you have found. That s the nature of ther nterest. It s an nterest n the subject matter of ths nqury. They do not have a legal interest. They undoubtedly have other interests beyond the Terms of Reference here, including significant litigation claims that may be pursued. internal inquiries should not become a proxy for those other interests.
[Emphasis added]
They also have stated an nterest n usng ths nqury as a vehcle to clear ther names. Ths s not that vehcle. It s not an nqury nto ther actons. To make t an nqury that would look to the prospect of clearng ther names s equally to make t an nqury that has the prospect of condemnng these ndvduals. And that s not the case. That s not the task of ths nqury. Despte the Attorney-General's attempt to separate the cvl ltgaton mplcatons from the Inqury process, the terms of reference betray the government's conscous effort to nsulate ts officals from potental cvl lablty. As prevously descrbed, the terms create the presumpton of secrecy when they call for the Commssoner to take "all steps necessary to ensure that the Inqury s conducted n prvate." The terms also specfically mandate that the Commssoner only examne actons of Canadan officals nsofar as they are causally connected to ether detenton or mstreatment, 148 a product of the Attorney-General's experence n the Arar Inqury, where Commssoner O'Connor construed hs mandate to nclude reportng on actons not only that "caused or contrbuted" to Arar's fate, but that also created or ncreased an unacceptable rsk of harm. 149 Commssoner Iacobucc took a somewhat more lmted approach, although one that was more expansve than the "but for" test advocated by the AttorneyGeneral, when he concluded that hs mandate permtted hm to make findngs where, based on all of the evdence and the ratonal nferences to be drawn from t, the actons of Canadan officals could be sad to have "lkely contrbuted" to the detenton and mstreatment of the three men. 150 Interestngly, t was precsely because hs mandate dd not permt hm to draw any conclusons about cvl or crmnal lablty that he found the "but for" standard used n tort law to be napproprate. 151 Commssoner Iacobucc ultmately found certan actons by DFAIT and the RCMP to be "deficent," as he nterpreted that word n the terms of reference. 152 He was careful to pont out that he found no malce on the part of the officals n queston, and that the deficent actons led "ndrectly" to detenton and mstreatment. By vrtue of the Supreme Court of Canada's decson n the Krever Commsson case, 153 however, none of these findngs are bndng n the outstandng cvl proceedngs brought by Almalk aganst the Attorney-General and several ndvduals. 154 That the work of publc nqures cannot be utlzed n subsequent cvl trals has led Treblcock and Austn to suggest that t would be "better to resolve vctms' rghts to compensaton through generc admnstratve no-fault compensaton schemes rather than the cvl ltgaton process." 155 Stll, findngs
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Access to Justice for the Wrongfully Accused 199 of commssons of nqury can and often do nfluence medaton processes wthn the cvl acton. Arar's mult-mllon dollar compensaton resulted from an ntense medaton process wthn just a few months of the release of Commssoner O'Connor's report. The findngs n the Iacobucc Report also mght sgnal the ease -or dfficulty -wth whch Almalk and the other men wll be able to establsh that the nvestgatons were neglgent and caused, among other thngs, false mprsonment, battery, defamaton, and breach of Charter rghts. 156 There are two fundamental lmtatons n usng tort law and cvl ltgaton to acheve the ends sought by the wrongfully accused. Frst, as Archbald Kaser argued twenty years ago n relaton to the "compensatory obstacles" faced by the wrongfully convcted, there are nherent dfficultes n usng tort law to medate clams between the ndvdual and the state. 157 These dfficultes are both structural and normatve; that s, cvl ltgaton s expensve and uncertan by nature, and the relevant causes of acton are ether nascent (such as the tort of neglgent nvestgaton) or notorously dfficult to establsh (such as malcous prosecuton). A second overarchng mpedment presented by a tort acton s the partcular role natonal securty prvlege wll play n any such acton, whatever the nomnate torts clamed.
No acton brought by a wrongfully accused person n the natonal securty context has gone to tral n Canada. Experence wth such ltgaton south of the border, and the accompanyng academc and legal debates, provde nsght as to the potental lmtatons of cvl ltgaton as an access to justce mechansm. On October 9, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court dened the petton of Khaled ElMasr, a German ctzen of Lebanese descent, who sought damages for volaton of the Due Process Clause and varous nternatonal human rghts nstruments stemmng from hs extra-ordnary rendton and torture by CIA agents. 158 The CIA's targetng of El-Masr was reported to have been acknowledged by senor Whte House officals as an "error" resultng from mstaken dentty, 159 n a rendton program that the U.S. Presdent hmself acknowledged publcly. Nevertheless, the federal government asked the court to dsmss the case on grounds that the proceedngs would jeopardze natonal securty and reveal state secrets. The Fourth Crcut Court of Appeals agreed that the state secrets prvlege properly appled and struck the clam. 160 The state secrets prvlege s a common law evdentary prvlege n the Unted States. Its purpose s to block the dsclosure n ltgaton of nformaton that wll damage natonal securty. The prvlege s derved from the Presdent's consttutonal authorty over mltary and dplomatc affars, and must be formally asserted by the head of the Executve Branch agency wth control over the state secrets n queston. 161 In the El-Masr case, the Drector of the CIA filed an ex parte declaraton, as well as an unclassfied verson, statng that damage to natonal securty could result f the defendants were requred to admt or deny El-Masr's allegatons. 162 The Dstrct Court found that the prvlege was valdly asserted, and then went on to consder whether specal procedural mechansms could be devsed to prevent the dsclosure of the state secrets f the case were allowed to proceed. Where the very queston on whch a case turns s tself a state secret -here, the exstence and operaton of Amerca's extra-ordnary rendton program -dsmssal was sad to be the approprate remedy. 163 The court held that because the entre am of the sut was to prove the exstence of state secrets, procedures lke securty clearng counsel would be nadequate as they would ental consderable rsk of nadvertent dsclosure. In the result, El-Masr's prvate nterests gave way to natonal nterests n preservng state secrets.
In hs closng words, Judge Ells of the Dstrct Court commented on the apparent unfarness of hs decson, statng that "all far-mnded people, ncludng those who beleve that state secrets must be protected, that ths lawsut cannot proceed, and that rendtons are a necessary step to take n ths war, must also agree that El-Masr has suffered njures as a result of our country's mstake and deserves a remedy. Yet, t s also clear from the result reached here that the only sources of that remedy must be the Executve Branch or the Legslatve Branch, not the Judcal Branch." 164 Commentators unversally decred the result n El-Masr and the state secrets prvlege as emblematc of broader patterns of secrecy and the lawless enclave n whch natonal securty clams resde. 165 The crtques also ponted out that the asserted dangers to natonal securty were often subsequently demonstrated to have been exaggerated; "[t]o put t another way, when natonal securty clams are advanced, there may well be a confuson of the nterests of the admnstraton
